



# The Evolution of Cybercrime and Cyberdefense

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Criminal Investigation Division (CID)

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All screenshots and diagrams in this paper were provided by the U.S. Secret Service CID and Trend Micro.

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# The Cradle of Cybercrime

The early years of the millennium was plagued by loosely interconnected networks of Russian-speaking cybercriminals intent on profiting from nefarious schemes. They raked in millions from trafficking in stolen payment card data to developing a robust underground network that provided bulletproof-hosting and online money laundering services. Over time, these networks produced and fielded the most innovative malware and botnets to prey on practically any individual or business online. Only in the past few years has the Russian underground's dominance begun to be challenged by various [cybercrime hot spots](#).

A combination of factors could be responsible for the rise in organized online criminality in Russia. Some would argue that the country's [emphasis](#) on science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education in high school could be a reason why it has some of the most infamous hackers worldwide. While most advanced cybercriminals are very skilled or at least comfortable with computers and related technologies, advanced mathematics or engineering skills would certainly make for a very successful career in cybercrime. Others single out [unemployment](#) as the greatest contributor to the explosion of cybercrime.

In addition to harsh economic conditions, there are a few other reasons for the rise in cybercrime like [lax law implementation](#). In the early 2000s, hardly any law enforcement agency or national legal system anywhere in the world was [fully prepared](#) for the legal and technical challenges posed by global organized cybercrime. This proved to be extra difficult for [cash-strapped](#) and [resource-starved](#) agencies in countries where cybercriminal underground markets thrived. To date, [72 percent](#) of the countries across the globe have enacted cybercrime laws. Some agencies may not have the resources to pursue cases that do not directly lead to a suspect's home IP address, which meant any criminal who knows how to use VPN and proxy services or hire bulletproof-hosting companies may be able to evade responsibility for a crime.

Cybercriminals often target e-commerce, retail, and payment systems in North America and Western Europe because of the volume of valuable financial data that flows through them. Only a few, if any, of their victims physically reside in their home country and so domestic law enforcement agencies and prosecutors do not pursue and prosecute them.

A key component of for-profit criminality is getting paid for carrying out malicious activities. Cybercriminals have been known to abuse a reliable, ready-made, and largely unregulated payment infrastructure that used electronic currencies in years past (like WebMoney, Liberty Reserve, and Perfect Money) and today's [cryptocurrencies](#) (Litecoin, Bitcoin, and Monero). Though these currencies were not created for criminal use, they are preferred means of payment for illicit products sold and services rendered, as users were often asked no questions about the origin of their funds and transactions were left unrecorded.

A lot of transnational cybercrime in the late 1990s took place on [Internet Relay Chat \(IRC\) channels](#), which proved to be raucous and disorganized as an e-commerce medium after some time. The cybercriminals behind early criminal networks like [carder.org](#), [carder.su](#), and [CarderPlanet.com](#) shifted to web-based bulletin board use. This gave the [pioneer underground market](#) a structure and its members a sense of discipline that allowed them to build their networks into online brands akin to major commercial service providers. Senior members further improved the underground economy by filling in roles like providing escrow services for illicit deals or vetting prospective vendors prior to membership.

Years later, underground marketplace, [Silk Road](#), shone the spotlight on the [Deep Web](#) as an even better hiding place for criminals. The anonymity that Tor offered, pervasive use of cryptocurrency, and well-structured criminal outfits backed by a hierarchically organized staff all contributed to the continued growth and evolution of cybercrime. While it is impossible to provide a comprehensive history of cybercrime, we need to take at least a glance at its history and evolution to understand it.

# 2000–2010: The Carding Era

During what we dubbed the “carding era,” online and brick-and-mortar businesses, along with payment processing systems, were targeted by skilled hackers specifically looking for financial data. At the same time, payment card owners were subjected to phishing and intrusion attacks that gave cybercriminals unrestricted access to their personally identifiable information (PII). The stolen details were then sold to other criminals who could sell fake payment cards to customers. Probably the biggest and ultimately most influential of such underground sites was the CarderPlanet forum.

Today’s black-hat hackers or cybercriminals have come very far from the [first hackers](#) in the 1970s who stole long-distance telephone time from Bell, caused irregularities in the accounting data of the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in 1986, or created the Morris worm shortly afterward. By 1990, FBI agents, through the U.S. Secret Service’s Operation Sundevil, already confiscated 42 computers and more than 20,000 floppy disks that were allegedly used for credit card and telephony service fraud. The cybercriminals of the 1990s were largely motivated by gaining notoriety and a thirst for uncensored information and knowledge.

Though the word “[hack](#)” in the context of computing owes its roots to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as far back as 1955, use of the word spread to computer users in general in the 1960s. By 1963, “[hacker](#)” gained both its current white- and black-hat flavors.

Cybercriminals first gained much ground in former Soviet states, likely inspired by the huge profits that could be gained from what we now know as carding services. Underground forums and marketplaces in the countries soon sprang up and prospered. In carding forums and marketplaces, criminals sold lists of stolen payment card details to anyone who wished to carry out identity theft and payment card fraud for profit. Since then, carding and other criminal services have exponentially grown in both volume and scale.

The early 2000s was marred by threats that put computer users at the mercy of the beginnings of what would be the most notorious banking Trojans—[Zeus](#) and [SpyEye](#). Any individual or business who engaged in online financial transactions proved susceptible to the nefarious ploys that took root in the first criminal networks in the foremost underground market.




Figure 1: Cybersecurity wins from 2000 to 2010

# Operation Firewall: The Path Toward CarderPlanet's Demise

CarderPlanet was founded in 2001 by [Dmitry Golubov](#) (aka Script). After some time, [Roman Vega](#) (aka Boa, Roman Stepanenko, Randy Riolta, or RioRita) and a number of other aspiring cybercriminals like [Vladislav Horohorin](#) (aka BadB) joined the organization. CarderPlanet had a mafia-like structure that was hierarchical in nature. It was led by a “Godfather” who was served by “Dons,” “Capo di Capis,” “Capos,” and even an advisor known as the “Consigliere.” The senior members of the organization were called “The Family” and used their authority to bring order and discipline to their criminal world.




Figure 2: Profiles of CarderPlanet's early key members

CarderPlanet used electronic currencies like WebMoney for transactions. This practice provided buyers and sellers alike security and pseudo-anonymity, resulting in an “efficient and reliable online marketplace for stolen financial information akin to legitimate e-commerce sites.” The site mostly used Russian though some posts were written in English.

When CarderPlanet closed shop in 2004, it had around 7,000 members. Some of its principal members were also believed to have ties with [Shadowcrew](#), a notorious U.S.-founded clearinghouse for payment card fraudsters, and the [RBS WorldPay gang](#). While most of the senior members of CarderPlanet spoke Russian, a smaller number of ranking members also communicated in English. Many of the latter were also active in the slightly smaller forum, Shadowcrew, which served as an online marketplace for stolen payment card data and other criminal goods and services.




Figure 3: Time line of investigation on CarderPlanet



Figure 4: CarderPlanet site before it was taken down



Figure 5: Proof of Horohorin's involvement in CarderPlanet

The U.S. Secret Service's Operation Firewall was one of the first major undercover operations targeting a criminal online carding organization. The operation's primary target was the largest English-language carding forum at the time—Shadowcrew—although many of its senior members were also active in similar sites like CarderPlanet, DarkProfits, StealthDivision, CVV.ru, and others.

Operation Firewall used a confidential informant, [Albert Gonzalez](#), who had been arrested for [ATM fraud](#) in 2003. Gonzalez was well-known on CarderPlanet and Shadowcrew, which he helped revive along with [Andrew Mantovani](#) (aka Deck) and [Anatoly Tyukanov](#) (aka VoX or mengele). Gonzalez continued to work as a confidential informant following the Shadowcrew takedown in October 2004 although some of his behavior began to arouse suspicion. A separate criminal investigation revealed that Gonzalez had, during his off-hours, been involved in intrusions into the networks of several major U.S. retailers. Gonzalez was arrested in May 2008 in Miami, Florida, and was subsequently sentenced to two concurrent

20-year sentences for conspiracy; computer, wire, and access device fraud; and aggravated identity theft connected to the said intrusions.




Figure 6: Shadowcrew before (left) and after (right) Operation Firewall



Figure 7: Evidence seized via Operation Firewall

# 2011: Breaches Were Brought to the Fore

2011 was dubbed the “[Year of Data Breaches](#),” as the world witnessed organizations succumb to targeted breach attacks and lose what we have come to know as the new digital currency—information. The year was particularly challenging for the security industry, as several breached organizations soiled their reputations via the loss of confidential information and spent huge sums of money on fixing damages. Two of the biggest targets—[RSA](#) and [Sony PlayStation](#)—were left with no other choice but to publicly disclose facts about the attacks against their infrastructure so their customers could ensure proper mitigation.




Figure 8: How data breach attacks work

The year was also plagued by mobile malware that sought to steal phone owners’ personal data led by [RuFraud](#) and [DroidDreamLight](#). [Survey scams](#) and all kinds of spam riding on trending topics littered social media sites, banking on reliable social engineering and hacking tactics and tools. On the vulnerability front, STUXNET-like [DUQU](#) could be considered one of 2011’s nastiest system threats. Known data stealers, [SpyEye](#), [KOOBFACE](#), and [FAKEAV](#), continued to figure in the threat landscape, along with [multiplatform spam](#) and malicious URLs. Hactivist groups like [Anonymous](#) and [LulzSec](#) also kept on casting their dark shadows online with their own political agendas.

**14 JUNE 2011**

Operation Firewall: Shadowcrew criminal, Aleksey Kolarov (aka APK), was sentenced to 30 months in prison

U.S. Secret Service and partners

**NOVEMBER 2011**

Suvorov pleaded guilty to other charges

U.S. Secret Service



**09 NOVEMBER 2011**

Operation Ghostclick: Esthost/Rove Digital was taken down; Vladimir Tsastsin and 5 other Estonian criminals were arrested

FBI with Trend Micro and other partners

Figure 9: Cybersecurity wins in 2011

# Operation Ghostclick: The Esthost/Rove Digital Takedown

Esthost/Rove Digital was responsible for infecting approximately 4 million systems in more than 100 countries aided by advanced Trojans and large-scale click-fraud schemes, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of damage and productivity loss for companies worldwide. The criminal network used several shell companies based in the U.S., Estonia, Ukraine, Denmark, and other countries for malicious activities; had an office in Tartu, Estonia; and was even touted as the "most innovative IT company" in the country in 2007 by a local newspaper.




Figure 10: Operation Ghostclick time line




Figure 11: Evidence of Esthost/Rove Digital crimes

Esthost/Rove Digital infected around 500,000 systems in the U.S. alone, including those belonging to individuals, businesses, and government agencies like the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The criminals manipulated internet advertising to generate at least US\$14 million in illicit fees. In some cases, the malware used in attacks had the additional effect of preventing security software and OSs from updating, thus exposing infected machines to even more malicious software.

In the last few years prior to November 2011, Trend Micro researchers quietly worked with the FBI, the Office of the Inspector General, and security industry partners to take Esthost/Rove Digital down for good. This collaboration resulted in the successful seizure of the criminal network's infrastructure and arrest of major players, particularly CEO, Tsastsin, on 8 November 2011.

# 2012: The Post-PC Era

We declared 2012 the “post-PC era,” as cybercriminals started moving away from previously favored targets to focus instead on attacking Android™, social media platforms, and even Macs. It took Android devices less than three years to reach the volume of threats (led by premium service abusers and data stealers) that it took 14 years for PCs to reach.




Figure 12: Android device versus PC threat volume growth comparison

In 2012, the question was no longer if a system would be breached but when, as data breach and targeted attacks became the new norms. [Global Payments](#), the [South Carolina Department of Revenue](#), and [Zappos](#) were among the top breach victims. Targeted attacks like [LURID](#), [Luckycat](#), [Taidoor](#), and [IXESHE](#), typically aided by spear-phishing emails, meanwhile, were among the most destructive threats. Readily available remote access Trojans like [PoisonIvy](#), [PlugX](#), [Xtreme](#), [JACKSBOT](#), and [DRAT](#) in underground markets also sped up the process of launching targeted attacks. More STUXNET-like malware like [FLAMER](#) (aka Mini-Flame) and [GAUSS](#) also surfaced as the year progressed.

Cybercriminals upped the ante in 2012 as well, as they fine-tuned their tools and tactics, most notably ransomware, automatic transfer systems, and the Blackhole Exploit Kit. Other threats also did not remain idle, as the volume of malware like ZeroAccess and VOBFUS significantly increased. Major underground market activity in Russia and China was also observed.



Figure 13: Cybersecurity wins in 2012

# 2013: Digital Bank Heists Dominated the Scene

Good old-fashioned stick-'em-up bank robberies were pushed to the curb by [digital heists](#) in 2013. Cybercriminals aided by sophisticated techniques to get hold of payment card numbers, bank accounts, and even PII in a matter of minutes took the place of traditional thieves. Information is, after all, the new currency. And with it on hand, cybercriminals can hold victims at their mercy, which should make us all realize that we stand to lose more than we think.




Figure 14: Comparison of online banking malware volume in 2012 and 2013

Throughout 2013, old threats were “refined.” The online banking malware volume continued to increase even in countries they did not previously target as the year progressed. By October, the ransomware infection volume also rose, as the threat took on an even more crippling form in [CryptoLocker](#). These and other refinements echoed what we [predicted](#) would happen—cybercriminals would improve their existing tools instead of create new ones.

The mobile malware volume surpassed the 1-million mark as early as September. And while media coverage on targeted attacks may have decreased, threat actors still went after chosen organizations in Brazil, France, and Germany. In the vulnerability space, Oracle’s end of support for Java™ 6 led to problems that highlighted the risks involved with not upgrading or continuing to use unsupported software versions.

Taken together, while assaults against personal data were no longer new, they did not reach public consciousness as much as they did in 2013. Going after personal information proved to be a resounding theme highlighted by debates on Edward-Snowden-fueled revelations about state monitoring on citizens. 2013 may have, in fact, prompted everyone to ask one of the most important questions in today’s digital age: “How can we keep our information safe?”




Figure 15: Cybersecurity wins in 2013

# The SpyEye Criminal Operation Takedown

SpyEye first made its way into the threat landscape as “ZeuS killer.” It was heralded as malware that could possibly take on ZeuS/ZBOT in a bot war. Like ZBOT, SpyEye was notorious for stealing user’s online banking and other financial credentials. It also has rootkit capabilities, which allowed it to hide processes and files from victims. When ZeuS’s author “Slavik” or “Monstr” left the cybercrime scene, he handed over his source code to SpyEye creator, Aleksandr Panin (aka Gribodemon or Harderman). Panin had other plans it seemed though, as he also disappeared from the cybercrime scene, leaving others to continue what he started. Hamza Bendellaj picked up where Panin left off. After years of investigation, both Panin and Bendellaj were arrested and later on incarcerated. Even known affiliates like James Bayliss (aka jam3s) did not escape the hands of the law.



Figure 16: SpyEye case time line

# 2014: The Cyberattack Era

2014 showed just how destructive [cyberattacks](#) could be to individuals and companies alike. Effects of losing massive amounts of confidential data to attackers, substantive financial losses, and irreparable reputation damage ran rampant throughout the year. The severity of the cyberattacks we witnessed like those on [Code Spaces](#), [P.F. Chang's](#), [Sony Pictures](#), [Amtrak](#), and other companies and their effects revealed one thing—the risk of becoming the next victim definitely increased.

	WIPALL	STUXNET	BlackPOS	Master Boot Record Wiper in South Korea Attacks
Malware components	Several backdoors and malicious .SYS files	A worm, an .LNK file, and a rootkit	A Trojan	A dropper and a Trojan
Arrival/Autostart mechanism	Insufficient data	Arrives via USB drives;.LNK file executes copies of the worm	Exploits 4 vulnerabilities	Uses a link in spear-phishing emails; exploits a Hangul Word Processor vulnerability
Stealth mechanism	Disables a system's real-time scanner	Uses exploits and a rootkit component	Mimics security software to evade detection	Mimics legitimate Windows® services
Lateral movement	Uses predefined credentials to hack network shares	Installs client and server components to execute network commands	Insufficient data	Checks saved Secure Shell credentials for accounts with root access
Information stolen	Insufficient data	Allows attackers to view and alter project databases and information from the WinCC® server	Steals payment card credentials stored in infected point-of-sale (PoS) systems	Leaks confidential information
Purpose	File deletion from systems and fixed and remote drives	Control programmable logic controllers	Payment card data theft	Sabotage

Table 1: Proof of constant improvements to cybercrime and -attack tools

Breaches aided by PoS RAM scrapers showed a staggering increase in volume, making 2014 the “year of PoS malware” as well. Apart from massive-scale breaches, attacks targeting vulnerabilities like Heartbleed and Shellshock in widely used, previously considered secure open source software, along with FakeID and Same Origin Policy Bypass in mobile devices and platforms were also seen. Established processes like two-factor authentication also proved susceptible to attacks as shown by the criminals behind Operation Emmental.

Cybercriminals always set their sights on one thing—profit. They continued to indiscriminately hit data gold mines because peddling stolen information was lucrative as evidenced by the thriving cybercriminal underground economy.




Figure 17: Cybersecurity wins in 2014

# 2015: The Year of Big Botnet Busts

Shifts in the cyberthreat landscape aided by [new technologies and attack models](#) were seen in 2015. Familiar challenges became more complicated given changes in attackers' modus operandi. Data breaches did not just end with compromise; stolen information was instead leaked to the public or used in more damaging attacks like those on [Ashley Madison](#) members, [Hacking Team](#), and the [U.S. Office of Personnel Management](#).




Figure 18: Biggest data breach attacks in 2015

Attacks that used **zero-day exploits** still prevailed, aided by advancements in exploit kits. These tools figured in cyberespionage campaigns like **Pawn Storm**. Crimeware offerings, portals, and training evolved to match cybercriminal demands in Brazil. Fledgling marketplaces emerged in **France, Germany, Japan, and North America**, alongside their more mature counterparts in Russia and China. All of these markets found ways to take advantage of darknets and the Deep Web.

Technological developments, particularly in the **Internet of Things (IoT)** space, also created a much broader attack surface. As the number of successful hacks on smart devices and **vehicles** grew, it was only a matter of time before threat actors found ways to exploit weaknesses for large-scale attacks, as our **GasPot** experiment showed.

Despite increased sophistication in threats and attacks seen in 2015 though, it was a great year for the good guys. The year was marked by several successful global takedowns and cybercriminal arrests. The takedown of long-standing botnets—**Beebone/AAEH, SIMDA, and Bugat/Cridex/Dridex**—and the arrest of major actors in criminal enterprises—**Esthost/Rove Digital** and **reFUD.me**—proved that cybercriminals were not above the law. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) between law enforcement agencies and security practitioners remained steadfast in keeping the world cybersecure.




Figure 19: Cybersecurity wins in 2015

# The reFUD.me/Cryptex Reborn Criminal Operation Takedown

The reFUD.me/Cryptex Reborn takedown on 23 November 2015 also led to the arrest and later incarceration of Goncalo Esteves (aka KillaMuvz). reFUD.me was heavily advertised in underground forums as early as February 2015. It was continually improved until at least June of the same year to bypass 30–40 of the best antivirus products in the market. Cryptex Reborn, meanwhile, was a popular crypting service that boasted of turning malware fully undetectable (FUD). After a couple of years of investigation, Esteves was sentenced to prison on 15 February 2018.



Figure 20: reFUD.me/Cryptex Reborn case time line



Figure 21: Evidence gathered on reFUD.me/Cryptex Reborn

# 2016: The Digital Extortion Era

2016 was a trying year for enterprises, as cyberthreats caused billions of dollars in corporate losses. It was indeed the “year of online extortion” with ransomware and business email compromise (BEC) leading the charge.




Figure 22: Countries most affected by BEC scams in 2016

Vulnerabilities discovered in widely used devices, including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) equipment, also surpassed volume records, pushing security researchers and malicious actors to race to find weak points in systems.

2016 also bore witness to the [biggest data breach](#) in history, which exposed issues in how companies handled user data. Other organizations, meanwhile, felt the effects of poor IoT security with the onset of massive distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks via botnets like [Mirai](#). The demise of the [Angler Exploit Kit](#) gave rise to other kits, which along with ATM malware like [Skimer](#) and [Alice](#), continued to pose challenges to businesses' security posture.

PPPs continued to prove worthwhile in the fight against cybercrime, as 2016 bore witness to more cybersecurity wins, including the arrest of one of the most prolific payment card data traffickers, [Roman Seleznev](#) (aka Track2, Bulba, nCuX, or psycho), and a BEC scam mastermind (aka [Mike](#)). The yearend was also marked by the takedown of another criminal network—[Avalanche](#).




Figure 23: Cybersecurity wins in 2016

# The Crackdown on Track2

The efforts of the U.S. Secret Service led to the arrest and incarceration of Seleznev who was responsible for more than 400 individual network intrusions and marketing and selling hundreds of thousands of stolen payment card account numbers and other financial data in underground markets. Seleznev illicitly earned US\$169 million from victims and compromised more than 3,000 banking and financial institutions.




Figure 24: Track2 investigation time line



Figure 25: Evidence gathered on Track2

# 2017: Ransomware Reigning Supreme

[Susceptibility](#) tied the threats of 2017 together. The year showed that systems, platforms, and people were all at risk of security threats. [Global ransomware outbreaks](#) that banked on the year's nastiest variants, [WannaCry](#) and [Petya](#), cost enterprises huge sums of money and lost information.




Figure 26: WannaCry volume upsurge in 2017

In April, the [Shadow Brokers](#) hacker group leaked reportedly National Security Agency exploits, [EternalBlue](#) and [EternalRomance](#), which later on figured in major threat campaigns like the WannaCry, Petya, and [Bad Rabbit](#) attacks. On the mobile device front, vulnerabilities like [Dirty COW](#) gave users quite a scare as well. The year also witnessed a rise in the volume of [zero-day vulnerabilities](#) discovered in SCADA systems.

While [BEC scams](#) continued to challenge enterprises, woes brought on by [cryptocurrency mining](#) and other threats' meteoric ascent to 2017's list of top threats plagued normal users. [Cryptocurrency platforms](#), [mobile devices](#), and even [social media](#) were all affected by miners and similar threats. IoT botnets continued to cause [large-scale DDoS attacks](#) akin to Mirai. And despite the drop in data breach disclosures, even more enterprise records ended up in attackers' hands. [Equifax](#) and [Uber](#) were just two of the well-known companies that lost customer data to hackers.

All was not lost, however, as the crackdown on cybercrime continued with the [arrest of Ruslans Bondars](#) (aka b0rland, Borland, Ruslan Bondar, or Vasilij Kovalchuk) and [Jurijs Martisevs](#) (aka Garrik, Jurijs Bereverovs, or Yury Martyshev), the conviction of [Zachary Shames](#), Selevnev’s sentencing, and the nationwide cleanup effort of sites in [Southeast Asia](#).




Figure 27: Cybersecurity wins in 2017

# 2018: The Current Reality

In 2018, [digital extortion](#) will be at the core of most cybercriminals' business models, pushing them to get their hands on potentially heftier payouts. Though the global outbreaks of 2017's scale will be few and far between, we do not expect ransomware to disappear this year. Instead, the success of ransomware attacks will serve as catalyst for more damaging campaigns. Cybercriminals may opt to target an organization, possibly in an Industrial IoT environment, to get the biggest bang for their buck. Extortion will also come into play with the [General Data Protection Regulation \(GDPR\)](#) implementation. Attackers may target private data covered by the regulation and ask companies to pay an extortion fee rather than risk punitive fines of up to 4 percent of their annual turnover. This will drive a rise in breach attempts and ransom demands. We also expect the GDPR to be used as a social engineering lure the same way [copyright violations](#) (FAKEAV) and [police warnings](#) (ransomware) were in campaigns.

IoT vulnerabilities will expand the attack surface as connected devices gain ubiquity. Apart from Mirai-like DDoS attacks, cybercriminals will also use IoT devices as proxies to hide their location and web traffic, especially as most of them are not secure by design. We expect reports of drone-related accidents or collisions as well. Wireless speakers and [voice assistants](#) can also help hackers locate target houses for physical break-ins. Cases of biohacking via wearables and medical devices will also materialize. Even life-sustaining pacemakers riddled with vulnerabilities can be exploited for potentially fatal attacks.

BEC scams will ensnare more organizations to fork over their money to attackers. We foresee BEC incidents leading to more than US\$9 billion\* in global losses. Company executives will continue to be impersonated to wire varying sums of money in attacks. Instead of planting keyloggers, BEC scammers will continue using phishing .PDF files and sites to compromise accounts at lower costs.

The age of fake news and cyberpropaganda will persist with old-school cybercriminal techniques. We expect cyberpropaganda to spread via tried-and-tested spamming tactics. Manipulated political campaigns will continue to figure in smear tactics and deliberately shift public perception using tools and services that are readily available in underground markets.

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\* US\$9 billion is based on computing the monthly average of reported losses from June to December 2016 and multiplying it by 12. This only assumes that there is a flat growth for reported BEC incidents and victims.

Machine learning and blockchain applications will bring both promises and pitfalls. Moving forward, machine learning will be a key component of security solutions. While it enables more accurate and targeted decision-making, it also runs the risk of being outwitted by malware. The same is true for blockchain technology, which though expected to revolutionize business models, can also be abused for the anonymity that it provides.

Companies will face the challenge of keeping up with the directives of the GDPR prior to enforcement. Laggards will only fully comply if regulators impose fines. Data privacy watchdogs, meanwhile, can interfere with business operations by banning companies from processing certain data. Lawsuits may also come into the picture.

Apart from vulnerability challenges, loopholes in internal processes will also be abused for production sabotage. While real-world processes will allow enterprises to address physical performance issues, their virtual production networks can be maliciously manipulated to disrupt operations or even cause damage. We also expect to find new security flaws in widely used platforms, as attackers renew their focus on browser-based and server-side vulnerabilities to deliver more destructive payloads.




Figure 28: Cybersecurity wins in 2018

# The Scan4you Takedown

Sometime in [May 2017](#), the FBI arrested and extradited two of the major players in the Scan4you criminal venture, Bondars and Martisevs. Scan4you has been offering counter-antivirus services to criminals since at least 2009. They have been engaging in criminal endeavors since 2006. They have been involved in ventures like Eva Pharmacy, which illegally sold prescription and non-Food and Drug Administration-approved drugs; launched banking malware attacks; and sold stolen payment card credentials in the past.

Martisevs, in his hearing, revealed that one of Scan4you's customers included serious cybercrime perpetrators like those involved in a massive breach attack in November 2013. [Bondars](#), was sentenced to 14 years in prison for his involvement on 21 September 2018.




Figure 29: Scan4you case time line

# Public-Private Partnerships Versus Cybercrime

If the past 15 years or so is any indication, [forging PPPs](#) is the best way to fight against cybercrime. And there are various [reasons](#) why that is so. First, the evidence that the police need to solve a cybercrime may not be on hand; it may instead be held by a private company outside its jurisdiction. Next, in cases where the private company resides in the same locale as the criminal, it may also be more familiar with not just the place's culture but also the laws that govern it. Partnerships are essential to making cross-jurisdiction and -culture cooperation work. Finally, in cybercrime investigations, fewer restrictions may apply to private companies than to national law enforcement agencies.

Cybercrime's ubiquity has pushed even organizations like the [World Economic Forum](#) to push PPPs to address the issue in 2016. Four elements that would make PPPs work against cybercrime were identified—information sharing, cooperation, adherence to and harmonization of existing laws, and issue discussion and resolution.

To fight cybercrime, the public and private sectors need to create permanent and secure information-sharing channels. Information on hacking cases, new modus operandi, investigation experiences, prosecution details, technical prevention and protection measures, technological development trends and advancements, and IT best practices should flow freely between sectors. Creating a common cybercrime taxonomy and investing in technological innovations to meet future security challenges would also help. Creating global and regional public-private platforms to promote better cooperation between law enforcement authorities and the private sector is also beneficial. The members of both sectors should be encouraged to join and actively engage in existing organizations.

The public and private sectors should also adhere to the mandates of existing cybercrime and related (data privacy, GDPR, etc.) laws. If we are to help secure the digital world, we must strive to harmonize national laws for better cross-border and -cultural collaboration.

To ensure mutual cooperation, trust must be built. Opportunities for discussing and resolving cybercrime issues must be created. Possible obstacles to forging PPPs must be identified and obliterated. Incentives may be offered to encourage full cooperation. Capacity-building programs (investigation and forensics training, etc.) can also help reduce barriers to implementation.

Trend Micro and the [U.S. Secret Service](#) are both committed to combatting cybercrime. [Trend Micro](#), for its part, has long been assisting law enforcement agencies in cybercrime investigations. Our international partnership with [INTERPOL](#), memorandum of understanding with the [U.K. NCA](#), longstanding representation on industry advisory boards for Europol, and direct contacts within law enforcement agencies in various countries worldwide help us stay true to our mission—making the world safe for the exchange of digital information. It is the U.S. Secret Service's investigative mission, meanwhile, to safeguard the payment and financial systems of the U.S.

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